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1. Agency problem and dividend policy 
Correlated with the agency problem in companies, dividend policy has been the focus of 
finance and corporate governance studies for decades. Agency conflicts can develop in many 
ways, with various related parties and stakeholder groups involved – shareholders and managers, 
shareholders and creditors, managers and employees. Dividend decisions are an essential part of 
a company’s financial policy and include decisions on sharing profits and free cash flow with 
shareholders. It is therefore evident that where a choice exists – to pay dividends or retain funds 
for investing in capital budgeting projects – a balanced approach to the problem must be taken in 
an attempt to keep the interests of various stakeholders. As one of the corporate governance 
mechanisms used to alleviate the principal–agent problem and reduce agency costs, ownership 
structure and concentration have an impact on dividend decision-making. Dividends are a perfect 
tool to mitigate the expropriation of minority shareholders, La Porta et al. in [La Porta et al., 
2000] note, since they guarantee that payments are made to shareholders in proportion to the 
number of shares they hold, thus avoiding the concentration of wealth in the hands of controlling 
shareholders. Rozeff [Rozeff, 1982] notes that dividend payout increases external financing costs 
but reduces managerial opportunism costs.  
Ongoing research and business practice show that  a company’s dividend policy does not 
depend solely on corporate ownership being concentrated in the hands of its major shareholders, 
but also that shareholder identity has an essential impact on the dividend decisions made by 
companies [La Porta et al. 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2001; Kouki and Guizani, 2009; Bebczuk, 
2005].  
 On the one hand, a dividend policy that provides generous payments to shareholders 
reduces the free cash flow available to management that could otherwise be channeled into 
inefficient projects with a negative net present value (NPV) [Black, 1976]. In cases where the 
company is in a steady financial position, a considerable portion of the profits that could be paid 
as dividends is held back by management as reserves to be used in case of losses [Fudenberg, 
Tirole, 1995]. 
On the other hand, as the agency theory puts it, managers can be presumed to use 
dividend policy among other tools to alleviate conflicts with shareholders. Managers might not 
be prone to cutting dividends, but would rather keep them at a certain stable level. They would 
even resort to external borrowings in order to support dividend payout. Managers find the costs 
of such borrowings lower than the potential costs that could arise from dividend cuts [Brav et al., 
2005]. Dividend payout disciplines managers who are driven by a capital market response that 
largely depends on the dividends paid on a company’s stock. Thus, it could be argued that 
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dividends force managers to act for the benefit of shareholders, or the consequences could turn 
out to be most unfavorable for those in control of the company.
1
 The works [Lang, Litzenberger, 
1989; Agrawal, Jayaraman, 1994] offer evidence that dividends serve to restrain managers from 
inefficiently using free cash flows so that shareholder interests are guarded.  
Management’s commitment to minimizing agency conflicts is also implied by the 
findings of studies investigating the relationship between ownership structure and capital 
structure. Thus, the works [Leland, Pyle, 1977; Berger, Ofek, Yermack, 1997] point out that 
management shareholding is directly related to leverage level, hence, managers tend to increase 
debt and decrease equity. 
A number of studies provide empirical confirmation of the hypothesis concerning the 
impact of insider owners on dividend policy. Researchers [Truong and Heaney, 2007; Short et 
al., 2002] demonstrated an inverse relationship between the share owned by a company’s 
management, particularly by its CEO, and dividend payout rate.  
In general, however, insider ownership is regarded as a way of minimizing agency 
conflicts [Theis, Dutta, 2009]. The entrenchment theory implies a non-linear relationship 
between insider share in a company and dividend payout (U-shaped relationship) [Schooley and 
Barney, 1994]. According to the theory, the relationship between the insider share of ownership 
and the amount of dividends is direct at first but turns into an inverse relationship as soon as a 
certain insider ownership level is achieved. Farinha [Farinha, 2005] has figured out empirically 
that the dependency direction changes at the point where the manager’s share is equal to 30%. 
This evidence is justified enough. In the case of a minor insider share of ownership, high agency 
costs can arise from unpaid or low dividends. If insiders own a high share, however, the 
principal–agent problem does not manifest itself greatly, and there is much less benefit from 
dividend payout in terms of reducing agency costs [Rozeff, 1982]. Owners can therefore channel 
a good deal of funds into company growth, which represents their main interest.  
At the same time, another viewpoint is also justified – if insider top managers happen to 
be major owners, they tend to channel profits into dividends since it helps increase their current 
income. This was confirmed by Dutta et al. [Dutta et al., 2004] whose studies demonstrated, 
using the example of bank dividend policy, that while dividends are low where insiders have a 
lower ownership level, dividend payout increases where the portion of shares is high.  
                                                 
1
 A telling example was that of Chrysler: the company faced shareholder discontent over dividend policy, which 
boiled over into a serious conflict in 1994–1995. Following unsuccessful attempts to persuade management to pay 
USD 6.6 bln in dividends, shareholder Kirk Kerkorian launched a proxy fight and attempted a takeover. Although 
the takeover failed, as did management deposition, the company ultimately increased its quarterly dividend rate 
[Lease et al., 2000]. 
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If the impact an owner manager has on dividend payout is a well-studied area, academic 
literature offers much fewer studies looking at the impact of owner identity on dividend policy. 
Empirical studies of the markets of Western Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
with their high ownership concentration [La Porta et al. 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2001; Kouki and 
Guizani; Bebczuk, 2005], point out that the agency problem between major and minority 
shareholders is no less acute than between owners and managers, and that major shareholder type 
can also impact dividend policy.  
 Maury and Pajuste [Maury and Pajuste, 2002] come to the conclusion that ownership 
concentrated in the hands of private investors and families leads to higher dividends in Finland. 
Similar conclusions are drawn by Setia-Atmaja, who studied dividend policy at Australian 
family-controlled companies – such firms demonstrate a higher financial leverage el and 
dividend payout ratio than similar companies with a different ownership structure. Furthermore, 
studies show that the positive effect family ownership has on dividend policy derives from the 
higher share of independent directors found at such companies [Setia-Atmaja, 2010].
2
 In 
Sweden, however, firms with private investors as the largest owners pay lower dividends, as 
Angeldorff and Novikov [Angeldorff, Novikov, 1999] note.  
The impact of the state as major owner is ambiguous. Bradford et al. [Bradford and Zhu, 
2005] found that in China, dividend-per-share value is higher where the state does not own a 
large share in the company, and vice versa, much lower at state-controlled companies. This is 
due to the fact that non-state controlled companies have much greater difficulty securing 
borrowed funds since banks are generally controlled by the state. As a result, such companies 
pay more dividends to gain a positive image and raise foreign capital. A number of authors also 
demonstrate that dividend payout tends to rise gradually in the case of state-controlled firms.  
Studies investigating the relationship between dividend policy and institutional investors 
as owners have also produced controversial findings. On the one hand, with major institutional 
investors, who are an extra monitoring tool, dividends contribute little to reducing agency costs 
[Easterbrook, 1984]. On the other hand, this shareholder group can be interested in having higher 
dividend payout in order to enhance management monitoring by capital markets – more so if 
owners deem their own monitoring efforts insufficient or costly [Farinha, 2003]. Gul [Gul, 1999] 
believes that since state ownership is similar in nature to institutional ownership, these 
arguments can also be true for companies where the state is the major owner. The work by 
[Khan, 2006], focused on the British market, demonstrated a direct relationship between 
                                                 
2
 This observation is evidence of the crucial role played by independent directors in dividend decision-making, 
which, however, is beyond the scope of this study.   
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institutional investors’ share and dividend payout. This may be due to the fact that financial 
institutions come under strict regulation by controlling agencies, so the parties in control of a 
firm are less inclined to derive private benefits of control. The dividend policy in place at bank-
controlled companies is not usually intended to pay high dividends that could call the debt issue 
into question or pose a bankruptcy threat to the company [Gugler, 2001]. 
One of important trends of the last decade is that scholars became more focused on the 
institutional context while studying dividend policy in emerging markets [Fairchild et al., 2014]. 
With this respect it is worth noting that Russia institutionally could be considered as an emerging 
market with specific corporate governance practices. It is among countries with a low 
shareholders rights protection and an important role that the state plays both in economy and 
company’s ownership structure. Therefore, dividend policy in Russia is relevant to study from 
the angle of various stakeholders relations: managers, minority and major shareholders.  
Besides general considerations on the ownership impact on dividend payments, it should 
be taken into account that the very phenomena of dual-class shares structure could explain 
differences in dividend policies on voting and non-voting shares and specifics of the ownership 
effects. This is mainly due to the difference of control rights and cash flow rights that takes place 
in these companies, as dual class shares structure is one of the mechanisms of separation of 
ownership and control.  
It is found, that when control rights exceed cash flow rights substantially there is an 
opportunity for minority shareholders rights expropriation [Bozec and Laurin, 2008; Claessens et 
al., 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997]. Wang [Wang, 2014] explored a controlling shareholders 
entrenchment in Taiwan, concluding that in companies with high degree of deviation in control 
and cash flow rights much higher proportion of earnings is paid out as employee bonuses than as 
dividends. It is an indicator of expropriation of minority holders as controlling shareholders in 
many cases are employees of Taiwanese companies, that it they use this type of earnings 
distribution for their own benefit. .  
High private benefits of control in Russian companies could be an indicator of control 
rights exceeding cash flow rights. These benefits, measured by voting premium, are derived by 
controlling parties to the detriment of minority shareholders [Muravyev et al., 2014].  Preferred 
(non-voting) shareholders are minority owners, and dividend policy may be one of mechanisms 
of expropriation minority holders of non-voting stocks by ordinary shareholders.   
Given the controversial findings of the studies, the speculative nature of the issue, i.e. the 
impact of ownership structure on a company’s dividend policy, and the virtual absence of such 
9 
 
research in Russia, the study of the impact owner types have on dividend payout could make a 
contribution to existing research in this field. .  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
A close look should be taken at  the types of major owners having an impact on dividend 
policy. Based on various classification criteria, studies use the following owner types: families 
and individual private investors, managers, boards of directors, non-financial companies, 
financial institutions, state, foreign investors, and offshore companies. Since families and 
individuals are not usually among major investors in Russia, the authors have not given separate 
consideration to the impact of these investor categories on dividend payout. 
Foreign investors. Maury and Pajuste [Maury and Pajuste, 2002] point out a direct 
relationship between the percentage of ordinary shares of foreign investors and dividend payout 
ratio. Bokpin [Bokpin, 2011] also revealed a direct relationship between foreign investors’ share 
of ownership and dividend payout based on a sample of Ghanaian companies where this owner 
type share in public companies averages approximately 32%. Baba [Baba, 2009] investigated the 
effects of increasing foreign ownership in Japanese companies on dividend policy.  Among his 
findings is that higher level of foreign ownership is related to higher probability of dividend 
payments. Kumar [Kumar, 2003], however, found no evidence of such a relationship for Indian 
companies where the share of foreigners is also high.   
On the Russian market, foreign investors can also prefer dividends to capital gains 
because of specific tax treatment. This assumption relies on the difference between taxation on 
dividends and capital gains for non-resident investors. The Russian dividend income tax rate is 
15% for non-resident legal entities and individuals. The income tax rate is 20% for non-resident 
legal entities and 30% for non-resident individuals
3
. Since there are no non-resident individuals 
listed among major company owners in the sample, the percentage of ordinary shares of foreign 
investors is assumed to  have direct relationship  with dividend payout ratio due to the lower 
taxation of dividends.  
Hypothesis 1. An increase in the percentage of ordinary shares held by foreign investors 
will increase dividend payout ratio.  
Offshore companies. As of recent years, a considerable share in Russian firms has been 
owned by companies incorporated in offshore zones: the Republic of Cyprus, British Virgin 
Islands, Republic of Malta, Principality of Monaco, etc. According to the Russian Statistics 
Committee, investments in the economies of Cyprus, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the 
                                                 
3
 The Tax Code of the Russian Federation, Part 1, 1998, Articles 214, 224, and 284. Available at: 
http://www.consultant.ru/online/base/?req=doc;base=LAW;n=108642. 
10 
 
Virgin Islands accounted for about a half of all of Russia’s investments accumulated abroad in 
the first six months of 2010 [How much funds…, 2010].  
Offshore companies, offshore holding companies in particular, are known to be widely 
used for the purposes of tax sheltering. Where dividends and interest are paid or other payments 
made by a Russian company in favor of persons incorporated in a region that has no double 
taxation convention with Russia, or if payments are made by such firms to a Russian company, 
the income is subject to two taxes: a corporate tax and, for example, a dividend income tax. 
There are, however, a number of countries with which Russia has concluded a double taxation 
convention, such as Cyprus, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands; and offshore 
zones typically have either no taxes or preferential tax rates. In the British Virgin Islands, for 
example, there is but one registration fee instead of all taxes, which is about one thousand US 
dollars [Offshore tax amounts, 2011]. Therefore, a company has virtually no tax burden.  
Since Russian companies can use dividends in order to transfer funds abroad, it can be 
assumed that higher dividends are paid where ownership structure includes offshore companies.  
Thus, when transferring dividends to an offshore company, incorporated e.g. in the 
British Virgin Islands where no taxation is used, a Russian company must withhold only 15% of 
the amount in accordance with the Tax Code of the Russian Federation, Article 284, Section 3, 
Subsection 2. It can therefore be more advantageous for a Russian company to transfer funds to 
an offshore owner for its services, allowing it to decrease its income tax base in Russia, manage 
assets more efficiently, and lower loan interest and royalty taxation. Most transactions can be 
carried out confidentially. Thus, Russian firms with offshore companies among their 
shareholders can pay lower dividends in order to transfer funds to offshore zones and pursue tax 
sheltering.  
There are therefore various positions as to dividend policy at companies owned by 
offshore firms, making it challenging to test the hypothesis that this owner type has an impact on 
dividend policy. 
 Hypothesis 2. If a company has an offshore shareholder holding at least 15% of ordinary 
shares, the company will have lower dividends. 
Under this and subsequent hypotheses, the minimum share owned by one of the largest 
shareholders of a certain type is assumed to be 15%. A number of foreign studies, e.g. [Maury 
and Pajuste, 2002; Farinha, 2005], refer to a major holding as a holding of at least 20% of 
ordinary shares. For the Russian market, however, we believe it is possible to define a major 
holding as a share of at least 15% since with this portion of shares, a shareholder gains 
significant rights when forming a board of directors. According to Russian corporate legislation, 
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a holding of 15% of shares can virtually guarantee that its owner will have a representative of its 
own on the board of directors. The board of directors must have at least 7 members in an open 
joint-stock company with more than 1,000 shareholders and at least 9 members with more than 
10,000 shareholders
4
. Consequently, a shareholder needs to have about 14.21% of the votes to 
get its representative on the board of directors in the first case and about 11.1% in the second 
case. Thus, a 15% shareholding allows its owner to influence the decisions taken by the board of 
directors – including those concerning dividend policy.  
Non-financial companies and financial institutions. A long and ongoing dividend 
payout history is a reliable indicator of a company’s capacity to earn a steady income and create 
value for shareholders; hence, these figures are used when deciding where to invest. It should be 
noted, however, that financial institutions are more interested in stability and steady growth of 
dividends, bringing in a higher stock value, than in high dividends amid volatile share-price 
fluctuations [Brealey, Myers, 2003]. The hypothesis that institutional investors’ share is directly 
related to dividend amount was confirmed on the British market [Khan, 2006]. The work by 
[Abdelsalam, El-Masry, Elsegini, 2008] also concluded that companies with institutional 
investors among their largest shareholders are more prone to pay dividends. At the same time in 
[Dahlquist et al., 2014] the authors tested the dividend tax clientele hypothesis on Swedish 
public companies and concluded that investment funds who have higher effective tax rate on 
dividend income than on capital gains, are reluctant to invest in dividend-paying stocks. Other 
institutional investors, e.g. life insurance companies and pension funds, are tax neutral between 
dividends and capital gains. For Russian companies the tax rate on dividend income is lower 
(9%) than the tax on capital gains (20%). Therefore we assume the direct relationship between 
institutional shareholding and dividend payout.  
Hypothesis 3. If a financial institution holds at least 15% of the ordinary shares, the 
company will have a higher dividend payout. 
Based on taxation considerations about the difference in taxation of dividends and capital 
gains mentioned above, it can be proposed that Russian non-financial companies will also prefer 
higher dividends. However, according to some studies [Khan, 2006; Maury and Pajuste, 2002], 
corporate investors vote for lower dividends on average, i.e. the percentage of ordinary shares in 
the hands of a Russian non-financial company is inversely related to dividend payout ratio. This 
could be explained by the fact that companies can derive more benefits from retaining earnings 
and reinvesting in company’s growth, than from receiving current dividend income. For 
                                                 
4
 Federal Law On Joint-Stock Companies dated 26 December 1995 No. 208-FZ, Article 66, Section 3. Available at: 
http://www.consultant.ru/online/base/?req=doc;base=LAW;n=105420. 
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example, according to results obtained in [Dahlquist et al., 2014], Swedish private corporations 
prefer growth stocks to dividend-paying stocks. Alternative explanation for this preference of 
non-financial corporations is that earnings reinvestment can bring more value to them, as 
investors in the future, creating opportunities to generate more free flows.  
Hypothesis 4. If a Russian non-financial company holds at least 15% of the ordinary 
shares, the company will have a lower dividend payout. 
State. International studies offer evidence of the ambiguous impact that a state has on 
dividend decision-making as a shareholder. Gugler [Gugler, 2001], for example, points out that 
the principal–agent conflict of interest is much greater at state-controlled companies. According 
to Russian studies there is a direct relationship between ownership concentration in state hands 
and dividend payout ratio in Russia, since dividends are a significant source of government 
income. The state managed to considerably increase budget revenues from dividends since 1990-
s.  It is also noted that dividend revenues were mainly contributed to by companies operating in 
the fuel-and-energy sector and by joint-stock companies with more than a 25% share owned by 
the state. Wei et al. [Wei et al., 2004] reveal their findings after studying Chinese public 
companies and also arrive at the conclusion that companies with a large share of state ownership 
have higher dividends, adding however that it concerns cash dividends only (while privately-
owned companies typically pay stock dividends). Bradford et al. [Bradford et al., 2013] came to 
similar conclusion that state-controlled public firms in China pay higher dividends, than 
privately-controlled firms mainly because of capital constraints of the latter. Non-state owned 
enterprises in China have less opportunities of attracting capital, both debt and equity, than state-
owned companies. And government plays extremely important role in company’s dividend 
decisions.  
The role of the state as a major owner and its participation in a dividend policy 
development can differ substantially from those of other shareholders.
5
.The state established a 
minimum percentage of net earnings to be paid as dividends at state-owned companies, 
                                                 
5
 The state essentially participates in the management of a joint-stock company by: 1) exercising its rights 
as a shareholder in an open joint-stock company, which is the main pattern of exercising its rights; 2) representing 
the state on the board of directors of a joint-stock company; 3) participating in company management by exercising 
its special “golden share” right. This study’s sample does not include any companies where the state has a “golden 
share” right, so this phenomenon is not considered in detail. 
Another way for the state to participate in a joint-stock company is to participate indirectly through parent 
companies in which the Russian Federation or government bodies are the majority shareholders. Such a participation 
pattern is very common. It is, however, difficult in such cases to ensure that the state participates in the management 
of subsidiaries through its representatives in the parent company’s governing bodies. This is due to the fact that only 
critical issues related to the activities of subsidiaries are submitted for consideration to the parent company’s board 
of directors or shareholders’ general meeting. As a result, most decisions at subsidiaries and affiliates cannot be 
directly controlled by the state. Similar consequences arise when the state’s share holdings are transferred to state 
corporations [Vinnitsky, 2009]. 
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accounting for 25% as a dividend payout ratio. As dividend income is an important part of the 
state budget, it can therefore be assumed that the state will demand higher dividend payout as a 
major owner.  
Hypothesis 5. If a state holds at least 15% of a company’s chartered capital, the amount 
of dividends paid will increase. 
Insiders. Following the authors [Jensen, Solberg, Zorn, 1992], for the purposes of this 
study, insiders are members of a company’s board of directors, board chairman, and chief 
executive officer (CEO) as its executive body.  
Mauri and Pajuste [Maury, Pajuste, 2002] found that companies with CEOs who hold a 
large portion of company’s share have a much lower dividend payout ratio than those with a low 
percentage of ordinary shares in the hands of the CEO. This argument proves that top managers 
can use the entrenchment strategy and derive benefits for themselves instead of paying dividends 
to shareholders, which is also stated by other researchers [Truong and Heaney, 2007; Short et al., 
2002].  
As such, a company’s dividend policy is based on its financial performance results and 
decisions made by corporate executive and governance bodies: shareholders’ general meeting, 
board of directors, and CEO. It should be noted that, according to the agency theory, the interests 
of the board of directors and CEO can contradict those of the company’s outside shareholders. 
The CEO controls daily operations together with management and enjoys tremendous 
opportunities to derive her own benefit from making decisions unless such actions contravene 
the law and/or the company’s charter. Moreover, it is the CEO who presents the proposal on 
profits distribution to the board of directors. The board of directors, in turn, maintains overall 
control of the company and makes decisions on all of its activities except those issues within the 
competence of the shareholders’ general meeting. The board of directors is in charge of forming 
the company’s executive bodies and makes recommendations regarding the amount of dividends 
on shares and the terms and conditions of dividend payments, i.e. it also has a significant impact 
on dividend policy as the main body meant to protect shareholders’ rights. Although the final 
decision regarding dividend payments is made by the shareholders’ general meeting, the board of 
directors and CEO play an essential role in generating financial performance results that 
influence dividend payments, and producing recommendations as to the optimum amount of 
dividends. In accordance with the Federal Law On Joint-Stock Companies, dividends payments 
must not exceed the amount recommended by the board of directors.  
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Taxation of dividends is more beneficial for board members and top-managers holding 
company’s shares than other forms of payments: while the dividend tax rate is 9%, the income 
tax rate for individuals is 13%.  
Hypothesis 6. An increase in the insiders’ share in chartered capital will lead to an 
increase in the amount of dividend payments. 
 
3. Methodology 
 Following the research [Alexeeva, Berezinets, Ilina, 2014], the econometric study, 
conducted to investigate the impact of ownership structure on the dividend policy of Russian 
companies with dual class shares structure, was based on the regression model (1): 
itititititit uZYXPayoutDiv   43210_ ,  i =1, …,n; t =1, …, Т.   (1) 
The dependent variable itPayoutDiv _  is a variable of the dividend payout ratio at 
company i at time t. In equation (1), itX  is a vector of variables representing the concentration of 
ordinary shares in the hands of the company’s shareholders; itY  is a vector of variables 
representing the type of the company’s largest shareholders; itZ  is a variable standing for the 
largest shareholder’s holding structure; it  is a vector of variables standing for the company’s 
financial and operating performance; itu  is a random variable. All vectors and variables have the 
subscript it indicating that this information is measured for each company i at time t. The 
regression model also includes: 0  as an unknown scalar value, 421 ,...,,  as vectors of 
unknown coefficients. Note that this model is linear based in terms of its parameters, though the 
vectors of its variables include linear and non-linear components. 
 
 4. Data and sample 
This study’s sample includes companies with dual class shares structure listed on 
Russia’s RTS stock exchange for the period 2003-2009. The final panel included 598 
observations. Companies had to meet the following criteria to be included in the sample: both 
share types were simultaneously traded on RTS and dividends were paid in cash. Required data 
on the company’s ownership structure and dividend payout were obtained from the quarterly 
reports of the issuing companies. SKRIN and SPARK databases were used to acquire 
information on financial and operating performance, ownership concentration, type of largest 
owners, amount of dividends, and other data on issuing companies. 
Table 1 describes the variables used in regression analysis. 
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Table 1. Basic variables used in the regression analysis 
Variable Definition 
 Dependent variables 
Div_Payout 
The aggregate dividend payout ratio, the variable characterizing the company's dividend 
policy. Div_Payout value is calculated as the ratio of the sum of dividends actually paid on 
both classes of shares during the year to the firm's net profit following the results of the 
year when the dividends were paid 
Ord_Payout 
 Dividend payout on ordinary shares; calculated as the ratio of the amount of dividends 
actually paid on ordinary shares during the year to the firm's net profit following the results 
of the year when the dividends were paid 
Pref_Payout 
 Dividend payout on preferred shares; calculated as the ratio of the amount of dividends 
actually paid on preferred shares during the year to the firm's net profit following the 
results of the year when the dividends were paid 
 Independent variables 
 Variables included in vector Y 
Foreign 
The percentage of ordinary shares owned by non-residents of Russia except shares owned 
by shareholders incorporated in offshore zones. 
Offshore The percentage of ordinary shares owned by companies incorporated in offshore zones. 
State_share State’s share in an issuing company’s chartered capital. 
Offshore(d) 
Binary variable whose value is equal to 1 if the company has an offshore company with at 
least 15% of ordinary shares among its shareholders and is equal to 0 if it does not. 
State(d) 
Binary variable whose value is equal to 1 if the state holds at least 15% of ordinary shares 
and is equal to 0 if it does not. 
Fin_inst(d) 
Binary variable whose value is equal to 1 if a company has a financial institution with at 
least 15% of ordinary shares among its shareholders and is equal to 0 if it does not. 
Corp(d) 
Binary variable whose value is equal to 1 if a company has a non-financial Russian 
company with at least 15% of ordinary shares among its shareholders and is equal to 0 if it 
does not. 
Nominal(d) 
 
Binary variable of the concentration of ordinary shares in the hands of a nominee 
shareholder who represents an ultimate beneficiary, whose name (title) is not disclosed.   
The variable’s value is equal to 1 if a company has a nominee holder with at least 15% of 
ordinary shares reported among its shareholders (but there is no information on ultimate 
shareholders) and is equal to 0, if it does not. 
 Variables included in vector W 
CEO_share СЕО’s share in the issuing company’s chartered capital. 
PSD_share Share of the Board chairman  in the issuing company’s chartered capital. 
BD_share 
Share of all board members  in the issuing company’s chartered capital (except the 
chairman’s share). 
 Variables included in vector   
 Size Company size, measured as the natural logarithm of sales 
ROA Return on assets. 
Leverage Debt to equity ratio. 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric analysis. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Variable Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Div_Payout 0.311 0.681 0 1.934 
Ord_Payout 0.236 0.606 0 2.901 
Pref_Payout 0.078 0.099 0 0.982 
Foreign 0.029 0.110 0 0.957 
Offshore 0.116 0.632 0 15.072 
State_share 0.027 0.092 0 0.306 
CEO_share 0.001 0.008 0 0.027 
PSD_share 0.001 0.008 0 0.025 
BD_share 0.002 0.014 0 0.044 
Size 22.736 1.627 16 27.63 
Leverage 201.167 711.693 0 2336.27 
ROA 5.944 11.181 0 39.487 
 
The obtained results showed the following average percentages of ordinary shares for 
each type of owners whose impact on dividend policy is covered by the study: for offshore 
companies – 11.6%, foreign investors – 2.9%, direct state participation – 2.7%; share in 
chartered capital held by the CEO – 0.1%, the board of directors – 0.2%, the chairman of the 
board  – 0.1%.  
 Table 3. Percentage of companies in which certain owner types hold at least 15% of 
ordinary shares 
Variable Percentage 
Corp(d) 0.84 
Offshore(d) 0.17 
Fin_inst(d) 0.18 
State(d) 0.07 
Nominal(d) 0.11 
 
As evident from Table 3, there is a corporation with at least 15% of ordinary shares 
among a company’s owners in 84 observations out of 100. Financial institutions hold at least 
15% of ordinary shares in 18 percent of observations; the state owns at least 15% of ordinary 
shares in 7 percent of observations; and offshore companies in 17 percent of observations. In 11 
percent of observations, the type of the largest owners with over 15%of ordinary shares could 
not be identified due to the nominee holders reported.  
The charts below illustrate how the ownership structure of companies changed over the 
specified period. Yearly changes in the average shareholding of the owners covered by the study 
are presented in Fig.1 and Fig. 2. 
 
 
17 
 
Fig.1. Dynamics of average shareholding by the type of owner for the period  
2003-2009 
 
 
Fig.2. Dynamics of insiders’ shareholding for the period 
2003-2009 
 
As one can see, companies’ ownership structure changed significantly over the period 
studied. Note that such an owner as offshore company is rarely considered in foreign studies and 
that offshore companies having a large portion of ordinary shares is specific to the Russian 
market. All of the above led to the suggestion that, referring to the impact of owner identity on 
dividend decisions, the state, offshore companies, and non-state companies would have the 
greatest impact on decision-making process in Russian firms.  
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5. Regression analysis results 
Table 4 below shows the results of the regression analysis, aimed at testing the 
hypotheses of major owners’ identity impact on dividend policy. The table includes estimated 
ratios of model equations with various specifications of the variables indicating the share owned 
by foreign owners, offshore companies, Russian non-financial companies, financial institutions, 
and the state, or whether they are among the major owners. 
As already noted in the description of variables above, three dividend payout ratios were 
used as dependent variables: total dividend payout ratio for both share types (Div_Payout), for 
ordinary shares (Ord_Payout), and for preferred shares (Pref_Payout).  
Since the model evaluation was based on panel data, pooled OLS, fixed effects, and 
random effects models were tested. Testing revealed that the fixed effects model is the most 
appropriate to describe the empirical data.  
Table 4 suggests the conclusion that all of the models, except those in columns (3), (8), 
(12), (13) and (15), are statistically significant. 
Note that none of the variables indicating the percentage of ordinary shares held by 
various owner types proved significant in the Pref_Payout model.  
We believe that this finding is justified. Dividend payments on preferred shares could be 
considered as obligatory payments for a company, despite the absence of the legal requirement. 
Shareholders gain a voting right in case of the non-payment of dividends. Moreover, the non-
payment or incomplete payment of dividends can decrease the value of shares and become an 
obstacle to attracting financing through this source in the future. These considerations, which are 
a priori for all owners, place preferred shares in a special position in relation to dividend policy. 
And shareholders owning ordinary shares can hardly have a significant impact on dividend 
payout decisions as far as preferred shares are concerned.  
Further discussion of significant variables will therefore be held for the models with the 
total dividend payout ratio Div_Payout and ordinary share dividend payout ratio Ord_Payout 
used as dependent variables. The variable Offshore, indicating the percentage of ordinary shares 
of offshore companies, is significant in both the models, with the estimated coefficient for the 
variable Offshore expectedly negative. The variable Fin_inst(d), indicating whether a company 
has a financial institution with at least 15% of ordinary shares among its shareholders, is also 
significant in both of the models. The variable’s estimated coefficient, however, is opposite in 
sign to what we expected. The binary variable Offshore(d), indicating whether a company has an 
offshore company with at least 15% of ordinary shares among its owners, is significant in the 
19 
 
model with Ord_Payout as a dependent variable. The estimated coefficient for the variable is 
negative, as expected. 
Contrary to the assumption that dividend payout ratio is related to the percentage of 
ordinary shares of foreign owners Foreign and the percentage of ordinary shares of the state 
State_share, no statistically-significant relationship between these variables was revealed. The 
variable models, indicating whether a company’s shareholders include Russian non-financial 
companies Corp(d), the state State(d), offshore companies Offshore(d), and nominee holders 
Nominal(d) with at least 15% of ordinary shares, also proved insignificant.  Significant variables, 
representing the impact of shareholding of various owner types on dividend payout ratio, are to 
be considered further (Table 4). 
The inverse relationship between the percentage of ordinary shares of offshore companies 
Offshore and the dividend payout ratios for both the share types was supposed. Div_Payout and 
ordinary shares Ord_Payout was revealed to be statistically significant (columns (1), (2), (6), 
(7)). This result confirms the hypothesis that Russian corporations can use offshore companies to 
transfer funds to tax havens, use offshore loans and make other transactions related to tax 
sheltering and asset management, resulting in lower dividend payout on ordinary shares. 
Furthermore, the significant relationship between the binary variable Offshore(d) and the 
ordinary share dividend payout ratio Ord_Payout (columns (9), (10)) indicates that the ordinary 
share dividend payout ratio is 8.8 to 9.1% lower at companies that have an offshore owner with 
at least 15% of ordinary shares as a shareholder than at companies without such a shareholder.  
Since the inverse relationship between the amount of dividends on both share types (as 
well as on ordinary shares) and a company’s having a financial institution with at least 15% of 
ordinary shares among its owners Fin_inst(d) was revealed to be significant (columns (4), (5), 
(9), (10)), it can be stated that companies having a financial institution as one of the major 
owners pay, on average, 8 to 11% less net income as dividends on both share types and 7 to 8% 
less dividends on ordinary shares than companies without such a shareholder.  
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Table 4. Econometric analysis results 
Dividend payout ratio 
Ratio type Div_Payout Ord_Payout Pref_Payout 
Variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Foreign -0.159 -0.171 -0.577   -0.154 -0.161 -0.555   -0.035 -0.043 -0.032   
Offshore -0.618*** -0.599** -0.166   -0.361** -0.369** -0.137   -0.062 -0.055 0.016   
State_share -0.020 0.009 -0.561   0.027 -0.043 -0.623   0.025 0.017 0.036   
Foreign^2   1.024     1.039     -0.037   
Offshore^2   -1.100     -0.589     -0.173   
State_share^2   1.740     2.012     -0.109   
Offshore(d)    -0.065 -0.072    -0.088* -0.091*    -0.013 -0.012 
Corp(d)    0.068 0.050    0.056 0.049    0.007 0.004 
Fin_inst(d)    -0.077* -0.107**    -0.072** -0.081**    -0.010 -0.011 
State(d)    -0.017 -0.049    -0.025 -0.051    0.011 0.010 
Nominal(d)    0.073 0.062    0.050 0.038    0.011 0.010 
CEO_share  -1.748 24.345  24.387  11.263 28.191  30.541  1.538 2.473  1.443 
PSD_share  1.299 21.889  28.810  0.921 18.584  25.144  -0.373 2.195  2.334 
BD_share  -1.984 -1.566  -4.393  -2.647 -1.311  -3.667  -0.822 -0.681  -0.571 
CEO_share^2   -2726.0  -2673.6   -1815.660  -1994.594   -102.921  -15.902 
PSD_share^2   -1417.1  -1508.2   -1213.621  -1340.872   -165.080  -147.572 
BD_share^2   -56.131  0.560   -68.001  -33.760   -10.610  -12.273 
Size 0.073** 0.075* 0.069 0.076** 0.077* 0.082** 0.085** 0.079** 0.082*** 0.083** 0.021*** 0.023 0.023 0.022*** 0.023 
Leverage -0.0002** -0.000 -0.000 -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.00002* 0.000 0.000 -0.00002* 0.000 
ROA -0.006 -0.005** -0.005 -0.006** -0.005** -0.004* -0.004* -0.003* -0.004** -0.003* 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Cons -1.242 -1.285 -1.176 -1.415 -1.399 -1.575** -1.651** -1.525* -1.631** -1.663** -0.401** -0.436 -0.446 -0.418*** -0.449 
R2 0.0002 0.0005 0.001 0.0084 0.0052 0.0004 0.0008 0.0015 0.005 0.005 0.0001 0.001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 
p-value 0.0049 0.0618 0.1676 0.0043 0.0482 0.0247 0.0686 0.1761 0.0019 0.015 0.0289 0.1176 0.4472 0.0252 0.2146 
N 536 523 523 560 547 528 492 492 506 492 522 488 488 499 488 
 Note: characters *, ** and *** denote variables significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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We cannot fail to discuss why the variable State_Share, representing the state’s share 
in a company, turned out to be insignificant to dividend payout ratio. For the purposes of the 
study, we used data on the state’s direct participation in a company when calculating the 
values of the variable State_Share. However, additional analysis of the identity of controlling 
shareholders revealed the considerable share of the state’s indirect participation in a company. 
Based on the analysis, about 74% of controlling owners in the sample on average represent 
the state directly (in 3% of observations) or state corporations (in 71% of observations) that 
prefer a higher dividend payout level as one of the most important income sources for the 
budget. Table 5 and Fig. 3 illustrate the distribution of controlling shareholders by type. 
 
Table 5. Controlling shareholder types in sample companies 
  Controlling shareholder type 
Year State 
State 
corporation 
Non-state 
company 
Financial 
institution 
Foreign 
company 
Nominee 
holder 
Offshore 
company 
TO 
TAL 
2003 2 44 9 0 1 1 0 57 
2004 1 42 12 0 1 0 0 56 
2005 1 41 12 0 1 0 1 56 
2006 2 85 9 0 1 6 4 107 
2007 3 76 11 1 1 4 2 98 
2008 1 25 16 0 1 3 3 49 
2009 3 19 18 0 1 2 3 46 
Total 13 332 87 1 7 16 13 469 
Share 2.77% 70.79% 18.55% 0.21% 1.49% 3.41% 2.77% 100% 
 
Fig.3 Distribution of controlling owners’ share by type 
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 As it was already noticed Russian companies tend to register holdings of shares under 
a nominee holder, i.e. institutional investors and other authorized institutions. This fact is 
specific to Russia and such a form of ownership is permitted by Russian law. Besides, shares 
are often held through subsidiaries. All of that makes it difficult to analyze ownership 
structure because it can hardly be determined who is an ultimate beneficiary of a company’s 
shares.  
As is evident from Table 5 and Fig.3, the state holds the largest share, mainly through 
state corporations.  
As our analysis showed, the state’s share in companies’ capital was decreasing amid 
the crisis of 2008–2009. This may be due to the fact that the state was gradually divesting 
some assets, which was most probably triggered by the financial crisis, for the state was in 
need of extra funds. With the state’s share decreasing over said period, the share of non-state 
companies from the non-financial sector, which were ostensibly to become efficient owners of 
major holdings of shares, began growing. The share of offshore companies also grew, which 
is generally due to the increasing role of offshore companies in Russian corporations. Unlike 
in countries with the German-Japanese model of corporate governance, where banks and 
financial industrial groups hold the major share in a company’s capital, and unlike in the 
USA, where institutional investors play a major role on the capital market and have major 
holdings of shares, financial institutions in Russia do not own a major share in a company’s 
capital.  
Speaking of the variables standing for a company’s financial and operating 
performance, they are significant in most of the models where either the dividend payout ratio 
on both the share types Div_Payout or the dividend payout ratio on ordinary shares 
Ord_Payout is used. As expected, the dividend payout ratio is directly related to a company’s 
size and inversely related to financial leverage. The coefficient of the ROA variable is 
opposite in sign to what we expected – based on the regression analysis, the ROA is inversely 
related to dividend payout ratio. The estimated coefficients preceding said variables retain 
their sign in all of the models. 
Unlike the results for Div_Payout and Ord_Payout, out of financial and operating 
indicators, a company’s size and financial leverage have a significant impact on the preferred 
share dividend payout Pref_Payout, whereas the variable ROI is insignificant in the models. 
Hence, it can be concluded that the higher a company’s revenue, the more dividends on 
preferred shares will be paid on average; and the higher the financial leverage, the fewer 
dividends on preferred shares will be paid on average. No statistically-significant relationship 
was revealed between Pref_Payout and return on assets. 
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The obtained results lead to the suggestion that the nature of the relationship between 
ownership structure factors and ordinary share dividend payout ratio is similar to that of the 
relationship between these factors and total dividend payout ratio.  
The dividend policy pertaining to preferred shares is considerably different from the 
dividend policy pertaining to ordinary shares or both share types; it essentially depends on the 
company’s performance.  
 
6. Conclusions  
The findings of studies, as conducted by many authors, point to the fact that not only 
do major shareholders have an impact on dividend policy, but also that the nature of the 
impact varies with shareholder type [La Porta et al. 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2001; Kouki and 
Guizani, 2008; Bebczuk, 2005]. Following the authors, who studied the impact of ownership 
structure on dividend policy, we, in this work, tested the assumptions that foreign owners, 
offshore companies, the state, Russian non-financial companies, financial institutions, and 
insiders with a share in a company’s capital will have different impacts on dividend payout 
due to the agent conflict or differences in taxation between dividend income and capital gains. 
One of the important conclusions that can be drawn from the study is that dividends 
on ordinary shares dominate dividend payout behavior. By reviewing companies with two 
share types, the authors expected to reveal some specific impact of ownership structure on 
dividend policy for ordinary and preferred shares. The situation, however, is such that the 
discussion of dividend policy itself, with its possible variations and preferences of various 
stakeholders, comes down to payments on ordinary shares, which is probably due to the 
considerable difference in shareholder rights with ordinary shareholders enjoying rights that 
allow them to gain control of a company, whereas dividends on preferred shares are 
essentially regarded as a company’s debt. As far as payments on preferred shares are 
concerned, no impact of key stakeholders is observed and the conclusion can be made that all 
decisions on preferred shares had already been made as these shares were issued. The only 
thing a company must do in its current operations is to maintain the status of these shares and 
satisfy the interests of its shareholders, whose only possible right is a  cash flow right.   
Furthermore, the conclusions drawn from the analysis demonstrate a situation uncharacteristic 
of many foreign countries: while, on many markets, statistically-significant relationships were 
revealed between ownership concentration in the hands of various major owners, corporate 
governance factors and the dividend payout ratio on various markets, many such relationships 
have not been confirmed for the Russian market. These findings can notably be due to the fact 
that many Russian companies still do not have a clear-cut dividend policy. Their decisions in 
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this field can be conditioned on the intention to derive private benefits of control, dividend 
payout levels as required by law, commitment to maintain a company’s image in order to 
attract financing, adaptation to varying market conditions, etc. This influences dividend policy 
development and the amount of dividends in different ways. It should be noted, however, that 
the conducted analysis allowed us to reveal important regularities in the dividend policy of 
Russian companies.  
For example, there is a statistically-significant relationship between key financial and 
operating performance indicators and dividend payout ratio, as is the case on the foreign 
markets. The percentage of ordinary shares of major shareholders also has a significant 
impact on dividend policy related to ordinary shares. Out of the major shareholder types 
considered in the study, an inverse relationship has only been revealed between the 
percentage of ordinary shares of offshore companies, as well as a financial institution’s 
having at least 15% of ordinary shares, and dividend payout ratio.  
Consequently, an increase in the percentage of ordinary shares held by offshore 
companies will lead to a decrease in dividend payout ratio. The impact of offshore companies 
on the amount of dividend payments has not been considered in the foreign studies of the 
impact of ownership structure on dividend policy, since offshore companies have an 
insignificant share in foreign businesses and offshore companies do not play such a critical 
role in the economy of foreign countries, especially on developed markets. This contributing 
factor was included in the study of the dividend policy of Russian companies with the 
intention of reflecting the specific nature of Russian business where the share of offshore 
companies is still very high. The results of the study support the conclusion that it can be 
more beneficial for a Russian company to transfer funds to offshore zones, thereby decreasing 
its income tax base in Russia, manage assets more efficiently, and lower loan interest and 
royalty taxation. 
Besides, an inverse relationship has been revealed between the dividend payout ratios 
for both share types and ordinary shares and a company’s having a financial institution with at 
least 15% of ordinary shares. Consequently, companies having a financial institution among 
its large owners, pay, on average, 8 to 11% less net income as dividends on both share types 
and 7 to 8% less dividends on ordinary shares as compared to companies without such a 
shareholder. This finding allows rejecting the hypothesis made earlier regarding the direction 
of the relationship between these variables. According to the theory, however, financial 
institutions are more interested in stability and the gradual growth of dividends, bringing in a 
higher stock value, than in high dividends amid volatile share price fluctuations [Brealey, 
Myers, 2003]. High share liquidity also contributes to financial institutions’ decision-making. 
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It can therefore be assumed that companies in which financial institutions invest have more 
stable dividend payments and a lower dividend payout ratio  
Based on the obtained results, it can be concluded that the nature of the impact 
ownership structure factors have on dividend policy pertaining to ordinary shares is generally 
the same as that of the impact these factors have on dividends paid on both share types. 
Unlike the policy pertaining to both share types and ordinary shares, dividend policy 
pertaining to preferred shares essentially depends on a company’s performance. The obtained 
results therefore confirm that preferred shares are very close to a company’s debt in this 
respect. 
The article [Alekseeva, Berezinets, Ilina, 2014] and this paper show the results of the 
study that covered Russian companies with two classes of shares in Russia, for which 
ownership concentration and structure influencing a company’s dividend policy were revealed 
and analyzed. The conclusions presented in the study are consistent, to a certain extent, with 
the findings of foreign studies, yet there are also a number of specific characteristics owing to 
the special status of the two share types in Russia, the specific rights conferred thereby, 
specific ownership structure in Russia, the roles of various owner types at companies, and 
finally owners’ preferences as to using dividend policy as a mechanism of mitigating the 
agency problem.  
One of the most important conclusions yielded by the study, which is new to the field, 
is that the ownership concentration and structure, being one of the major corporate 
governance mechanisms, have virtually no impact on dividend policy pertaining to non-voting 
(preferred) shares, which is another proof of the special role played by dividend policy in 
corporate governance as a way of alleviating agency conflicts. It would be important in 
further studies of this issue to consider other factors of corporate governance that could 
impact a dividend policy in companies issuing voting and non-voting shares.  
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